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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

over the past 150 years, it has retained its character as a natural
waterway beginning in the foothills and flowing into the Wilson River)
improperly contradicts the ALI's findings. The court concluded,
however, that a preponderance of the evidence supported the factual
finding. In response to Gienger's contention that the department
improperly rejected and modified the ALI's factual findings in
concluding the creek was not a drainage ditch, the court stated that the
question of whether the creek was a drainage ditch under
administrative rules and section 196.905(6) is a legal issue as opposed
to a factual issue. Thus, any modification on that issue was not a
modification of ALI's findings of historical fact. The court clarified that
its function is to review the agency's conclusions for errors of law.
In his second and third assignments of error, Gienger argued that
the department's final order contradicted section 196.905(6) (which
exempts structures such as drainage ditches from permit requirements)
as well as the department's handbook on regulations relating to
drainage ditches. Pursuant to the plain meaning of the statute and the
definition of "structure" in the administrative rule, however, the court
affirmed that the channelized stream is a natural waterway and not a
drainage ditch. In order to be a drainage ditch under the section
196.905(6) exemption, the creek must result from manual excavation
with a design to remove water, instead of resulting from natural causes.
The court found the department's application of the administrative rules
plausible and consistent with the wording of the rules and section
196.905(6).
Lastly, in his fourth and fifth assignments of error, Gienger asserted
that the department wrongly concluded that neither of the exemptions
in sections 196.905(3) or (4) applied to his removal of material from the
creek. The court, nevertheless, agreed with the department that these
Although Gienger's property is a
exemptions are inapplicable.
"converted wetland" under section 196.905(3) and a "prior converted
cropland" under section 196.905(4), the court determined that the
exemptions did not apply to removing material from the banks of a
stream itself.
Accordingly, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the department's
final order.
Todd Likman
WASHINGTON
Grundy v. Brack Family Trust, 213 P.3d 619 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that (1) the "common enemy" doctrine exempting property
owners from liability for property damage due to surface water
diversions does not apply to seawater; and (2) damage from seawater
trespass is a cause of action for a civil tort of intentional or negligent
trespass).
This case involves next-door neighbors Calvin and Joyce Brack
("Brack") and Evelyn Grundy ("Grundy"), shoreline property owners

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 13

with estates abutting the seawaters of the Puget Sound. Both properties
include bulkheads to help control waterfront wave forces. In 1999,
Grundy brought a nuisance claim in the Thurston Superior Court after
Brack raised his bulkhead from 18 to 21 inches. Grundy complained
that increased wave splash and sea spray caused by the taller bulkhead
deposited debris and yellowed the grass on a portion of Grundy's
property. The trial court dismissed the action on summary judgment,
but ignored the "common enemy" doctrine, ruling that although Brack
had a duty to avoid injury to Grundy, the damage was too minor to
survive summary judgment.
The common enemy doctrine developed in England in 1828 as a
response to seawater flooding, and supported the right to protect one's
property from the "common enemy" of excess surface water. In its
strictest form, the doctrine allows property owners to divert or dispose
of surface waters from their property without any liability for damages
to their neighbors. In 1896, the Supreme Court of Washington adopted
this doctrine in Cass v. Dicks, and for over one hundred years the case
law silently encompassed the strict doctrine, protecting property
owners from liability to neighbors for property damage caused by
surface water and seawater diversions. During the twentieth century,
the doctrine fell out of favor in most states. Although Washington now
recognizes a "due care" exception to the common enemy doctrine, it
remains one of only twelve states still applying the doctrine in some
form.
In 2003, the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two affirmed
the superior court decision in part, but held that the trial court erred
because the common enemy doctrine immunized Brack from liability
from protecting his land from seawater trespass. The Washington
Supreme Court then reversed the appellate decision in 2005, ruling that
while the common enemy doctrine still applied to tributary surface
waters, it did not apply to seawater. The supreme court based this
decision on a definition of surface water as "a source characterized by
an inability to maintain its identity and existence as a body of water."
The ruling distinguished seawater from surface stream diversions. The
supreme court reversal removed Brack's common enemy doctrine
protection, allowing common law seawater nuisance torts for the first
time in Washington state history.
On remand, Grundy responded by adding trespass by water and
illegal diversion claims. In 2007, the trial court determined that Brack
had made an illegal diversion without considering consequences to
Grundy. However, because of the de minimus damages, the trial court
declined to weigh intentional trespass factors to determine whether
Brack knew or should have known that raising their bulkhead would
cause damage to Grundy's property. Instead, the trial court equated the
water trespass with a nuisance claim, ruling that Brack committed a
harmless negligent trespass.
On appeal from the second trial, the court of appeals disagreed with
the trial court's analysis that Brack committed negligent trespass.
Holding that the trial court erred in characterizing the trespass as a
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nuisance claim, the court of appeals went on to apply intentional
trespass tort factors from Washington state common law, agreeing with
the trial court that Brack did not intentionally or wrongfully cause
damage to Grundy's property, but reversing the trial court's trespass
conclusion. The court of appeals ruled that Brack's bulkhead diversion
was not intentional trespass because the intrusion did not cause
significant injury or harm to a neighbor's property. The decision
required remand to reflect that Brack did not commit an intentional
trespass, but left open the future question of how to analyze duty of care
for the newly created tort of negligent seawater trespass.
John McKee
WYOMING
William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 706 P.3d 722, (Wyo. 2009)
(refusing to grant a declaratory judgment to property owners who
attacked state administration of coal bed methane water because
plaintiffs failed to connect specific damage to state practice and could
have pursued administrative remedies).
The plaintiffs, William F. West Ranch, LLC ("West") and the Turner
family ("Turner"), are property owners in the Powder River Basin. They
sought a declaratory judgment against the State Engineer and the Board
of Control ("State") challenging the administration of underground
water produced and stored to extract coal bed methane ("CBM"). West
and Turner claimed the State was not regulating CBM water production
in conjunction with state law and that their land had been damaged by
CBM water. The District Court of Laramie County dismissed the action
holding it was not justiciable. West and Turner appealed, and the
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed. The dispositive issue was whether
the plaintiffs sufficiently articulated a justiciable claim.
The court characterized the claims of the property owners as four
distinct categories. First, West and Turner contend the State violated
Wyoming's Constitution by (1) not considering the public's interest in
its management of CBM water, and (2) not providing notice to
neighboring landowners when issuing permits. Second, West and
Turner contend the State management of CBM water violated state
statutes. Specifically, by not employing the concepts of beneficial use
and prevention of waste, the State did not act in the public's interest
when granting permits to CBM lease holders. Third, in what the court
terms a 'restatement' of the first claim, West and Turner claimed that
the State violated their due process rights. The court inferred that this
referred to the fact that neighboring landowners did not receive notice
and were not given an opportunity to be heard when the State
considered the permits. Fourth, West and Turner claimed that the State
violated the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act by not
promulgating rules specific to CBM wells and reservoirs.
The court looked to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to
determine whether it had jurisdiction. Subsequently, it used its own

